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SOME REMARKS ON GROUP LITIGATION IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
MICHELE TARUFFO*
I.  INTRODUCTION
When one looks at the group litigation situation in modern
common law and civil law systems, one discovers a huge amount of
data, in addition to a number of problems, discussions, and trends of
development.  In the 1960s, the landscape of group litigation was al-
most completely bare, with the only significant example being the
U.S. class action regulated by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. This situation has changed over the years and is now much
more interesting, but also much more complicated.
The U.S. class action underwent important changes in practice
and in its regulation because of several amendments to Rule 23.1  In
some countries—even in civil law jurisdictions—the problem of group
litigation (or, as it is sometimes defined, the problem of the judicial
protection of collective, diffuse, and super-individual interests and
rights) has been dealt with in several ways: new statutory regulations,
developments in case law, theoretical debates, and projects for re-
form.2  Much of the complexity of the present situation is due to the
Copyright  2001 by Michele Taruffo.
* University of Pavia (Italy).
1. For a general view of Rule 23, see Janet Cooper Alexander, An Introduction to Class
Action Procedure in the United States, Remarks at Debates Over Group Litigation in
Comparative Perspective (July 21-22, 2000) <http://www.law.duke.edu/grouplit/papers/
classactionalexander.pdf>.  See also 7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 23 (2nd ed. 1986).  For a discussion of the 1966 amendment to Rule 23, see
Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Actions and
Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 179 (2001).  See also ANDREA
GIUSSANI, STUDI SULLE “CLASS ACTIONS” (2000); DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS
ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN (2000); 7A CHARLES A.
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 41 (2nd ed. 1986); Judith Resnik, From
“Cases” to “Litigation”, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 5.  For a discussion of
other proposed amendments, see Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking
Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13 (1996).
2. Much information has been supplied by the papers submitted in this symposium, and
by the oral discussion. See Harald Koch, Non-Class Group Litigation under EU and German
Law, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 355 (2001); Roberth Nordh, Group Actions in Sweden: Re-
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fact that such problems have been—and still are—approached from
very different perspectives and with different strategies.  The class ac-
tion lawsuit in the U.S. system has evolved significantly and has been
adopted, with significant changes and adaptations, in other countries,
including those with civil law systems.3  However, many other coun-
tries, mainly in continental Europe, did not follow the class action
model and have adopted different approaches to the problem of
group litigation.  Most of these countries do not conceive of this
problem in general terms and take into consideration only particular
instances of collective interests, such as those involved in consumer
and environmental protection.4  Moreover, the use of group litigation
is usually not permitted for the compensation of damages suffered by
individuals.  Some countries are still at the point of mere discussion
and preparation of projects for possible reforms.5  In many other
countries, there is no sensitivity to the problems involved in the effec-
tive protection of super-individual rights.
Therefore, although it is impossible to give a complete account of
group litigation situations—and probably futile to attempt to draw
general conclusions in just a few pages—some preliminary remarks
can be made.
II.  PURPOSES OF GROUP LITIGATION
A very general and fundamental distinction can be drawn when
considering the purposes that may be pursued by means of group or
class litigation.  In practice, these purposes can be combined in vari-
ous degrees and in several ways, but theoretically, they may be kept
separate for the sake of simplicity.
flections on the Purpose of Civil Litigation, the Need for Reforms and a Forthcoming Proposal,
11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 381 (2001); Gerhard Walter, Mass Tort Litigation in Germany and
Switzerland, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 369 (2001); Garry D. Watson, Class Actions: The Ca-
nadian Experience, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 269 (2001).  In the literature concerning civil
law systems, see GROUP ACTIONS AND CONSUMER PROTECTION—L’ACTION COLLECTIVE ET
LA DÉFENSE DES CONSOMMATEURS (Thierry Bourgoignie ed., 1992); GIUSSANI, supra note 1,
at 321-348; PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION BEFORE EUROPEAN COURTS (Hans-W. Macklitz &
Norbert Reich eds., 1996); Per Henrik Lindblom, Group Actions and the Role of the Courts: A
European Perspective, 23 FORUM INTERNATIONALE 3 (1996).
3. The reference is to Canada (Quebec) and Brazil.  See GIUSSANI, supra note 1, at 338-
344.  See also Watson, supra note 2.
4. See GROUP ACTIONS AND CONSUMER PROTECTION—L’ACTION COLLECTIVE ET LA
DEFENSE DES CONSOMMATEURS passim (Thierry Bourgoignie ed., 1992).
5. See Lindblom, supra note 2; Nordh, supra note 2.  See also Per Henrik Lindblom, Indi-
vidual Litigation and Mass Justice: A Swedish Perspective and Proposal on Group Actions in
Civil Procedure, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 805 (1997).
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A. Compensation of Individual Harms
The first important purpose is to compensate individual harms.
In many cases, it may be said that litigation is damage oriented, since
it is aimed at achieving a judgment granting damages to a class or a
group of injured or harmed people and charging the wrongdoer with
the obligation to pay compensation.6  The ultimate goal is to indem-
nify each member of the group for the harm suffered.  Here, we are
mainly—although not exclusively—in the domain of torts, and the
most important situation is that of mass tort litigation.  There is no
need to emphasize that this category of damage oriented actions in-
cludes a wide range of subject matters—examples include the classic
case of a plane crash, the well-known cases of Agent Orange or asbes-
tos exposure, the use of defective products or harmful pharmaceuti-
cals, and tobacco addiction.7  These kinds of cases may be distin-
guished from each other in many ways (nature of the injury or loss
suffered, type of causation, number of people involved, size of com-
pensatory or punitive damages granted, etc.).  However, they share
the fundamental aim of providing relief in terms of monetary com-
pensation for the individual harms, injuries, or losses that have been
suffered by (more or less numerous) classes or groups of people be-
cause of the same unlawful actions.
B. Achievement of Changes
The second purpose is to achieve changes in the practice of some
subjects, in the regulation of legal transactions, or in legally relevant
behavior.  Since, generally speaking, actions of this kind are brought
in order to obtain new regulation of matters or behaviors according to
particular values and standards considered preferable for the protec-
6. See GIUSSANI, supra note 1, at 53, 253; Harry Kalven Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The
Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684 (1941).
7. Amongst the vast literature on mass tort cases, see JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL
JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND
OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES (1995); 7B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE 71 (2nd ed. 1986); John Fleming, Mass Torts, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 507 (1994);
Hensler, supra note 2; Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal
Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961 (1993); Patrick D. McTernan,
Comments, The Use of Class Actions for Mass Accident Litigation, 23 LOY. L. REV. 383 (1977);
David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of
the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851 (1984); Walter, supra note 2.  In the European literature
on the topic, see also Harald Koch, Mass Torts in German Law, in GERMAN NATIONAL
REPORTS IN CIVIL LAW MATTERS FOR THE XIV INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 67 (Erik Jayme ed., 1994); Andrea Giussani, Le “Mass Torts Class Action”
negli Stati Uniti, RIV. CRIT. DIR. PRIV. 331 (1989).
TARUFFO.DOC 08/06/01  12:53 PM
408 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 11:405
tion of the subjects involved, they may also be said to be policy ori-
ented.  This category of actions is extremely broad and internally dif-
ferentiated.  For instance, one may bring such an action to affect
changes in commercial practices (contractual clauses, fair competi-
tion, advertising, labeling of products, etc.) with the aim of protecting
consumers. Alternatively, an action might be brought with the aim of
enforcing civil rights and changing the functioning—or even the struc-
ture—of private or public institutions (i.e., banks for financial and
commercial practice, schools in cases of racial desegregation, and
prisons and hospitals in cases of structural or institutional injunc-
tions).8  The regulatory changes that are pursued by means of this
kind of litigation may concern private or public regulations.  For in-
stance, private regulations are the objective of consumers’ actions
aimed at eliminating or modifying illegal contract clauses imposed by
big companies on individual consumers or users.  Public regulations
that may be changed as a consequence of group litigation can be ad-
ministrative (as in the case of prisons, hospitals, and schools) or even
statutory or legislative (as in laws that are amended or statutes that
are enacted in order to cope with the problems raised by a group or
class action).  Of course, this is not a direct effect of a judgment deliv-
ered in a group or class action lawsuit.  However, it may be a practical
consequence of such litigation, when the issues raised and the policy
reasons advanced are taken into consideration by those with political
power.  This may be the case when funds are created, sometimes by
statute, in order to compensate the damages suffered by a class of
people, or it may be the case when there is projected “administrativi-
zation,” as in the asbestos cases.9  Such litigation may also result in the
enactment of statutory rules governing the validity of special clauses
in consumer contracts.10  Something similar may happen when a stat-
ute provides for environmental protection and includes rules con-
cerning the condition of people living in polluted areas.
8. See OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
1, at 492, 496.
9. See Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There a Need for an Adminis-
trative Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819 (1992); and the accompanying essays collected
in the same issue of CARDOZO L. REV 1891-2040.
10. For instance, the 1996 Italian statute introducing into the Civil Code art. 1469 bis with
the provision on new types of illegal clauses.  See Disposizioni per l’adempimento di obblighi
derivanti dall’appartenenza dell’Italia alle Comunità Europee (Provisions for the implementa-
tion of duties deriving from the membership of Italy in the European Communities), Legge 6
Feb. 1996, No. 52 (Italy).  See also GIORGIO DE NOVA, LE CLAUSOLE VESSATORIE (1996).
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It is easy to observe that these (and many other) situations are
extremely varied and may occur in a number of different areas within
modern legal systems.  However, they have a fundamental character
in common: litigation is used as a means to protect and enforce collec-
tive rights and interests by setting aside illegal practices and behavior
and by achieving directly—or provoking indirectly—the adoption of
new standards or rules.
III.  SHIFTS IN THE PURPOSES OF GROUP LITIGATION
This distinction between damage oriented and policy oriented
group litigation is very general, but can be used as a key to under-
standing the dynamics of significant changes occurring in many legal
systems.  Such dynamics are very different in common law systems
(especially in the United States) and in civil law systems (especially in
continental Europe).  Both systems seem to have moved from their
starting points, but these changes are oriented in almost opposite di-
rections.
With regard to the classic example of U.S. class actions, the main
function of this remedy when it was created in 1938 was to provide
compensation for many relatively small harms or injuries by opening
access to justice to groups of people who were presumably not able or
not inclined to seek redress by means of individual actions.  The main
rationale of Rule 23 was, in fact, to provide compensation for individ-
ual harms that otherwise would have found no other kind of relief.11
In the following decades, mainly in the 1960s and 1970s, things
changed substantially.  The purpose of compensating harms suffered
by groups or classes of people persisted, of course, but the relatively
new experience of gigantic mass torts went far beyond the original
model of class actions.12  The basic purpose of compensating individ-
ual harms is still present in mass tort class actions, but the dimension
of the classes involved and the amount of damages granted have sig-
nificant consequences.  One consequence is that when fluid recovery
leads to the creation of a fund as a means to handle the money in or-
der to compensate the individual members of the class, an organiza-
tional and lato sensu administrative activity by the court is required,
including the appointment of special officers, controls, regulations.
Another consequence (as was proposed in order to cope with the
11. See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 6.
12. See generally WEINSTEIN, supra note 7; Fleming, supra note 7; Hensler & Peterson, su-
pra note 7; Rosenberg, supra note 7.
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hundreds of thousands of asbestos cases) may be a sort of “adminis-
trativization” of the problem, by means of agencies or other public in-
stitutions charged with managing these cases.  This is a clear attempt
to resort to regulation or legislation in order to find answers to issues
raised by mass tort cases.13  A third consequence is the massive use of
punitive damages in these cases.  In line with the asserted fundamen-
tal function of punitive damages (to deter the wrongdoers from con-
tinuing or repeating their illegal behavior), it may be said that mass
tort class judgments also perform a regulatory function in reshaping
the patterns of the wrongdoers’ behavior (and also the attitudes of
other potential wrongdoers).
Thus, the scope of class actions has broadened substantially and
progressively to include new and different types of cases, character-
ized by purposes that can be defined as regulatory or policy oriented.
Correspondingly, the repertoire of devices provided by Rule 23 has
become much more sophisticated.  The introduction of the class in-
junctive remedy is a clear example of this expansion of class actions
far beyond the original goal of compensating individual injuries or
losses.14  The broader scope includes a large variety of new conflicts
concerning civil rights and the fundamental interests of citizens in
modern societies.  The legal language itself has changed in order to
indicate the new functions performed by class litigation.  Well-known
phrases, such as “public law litigation,”15 “structural,” or “institutional
injunction,”16 illustrate the way in which litigation is oriented toward
enforcing new collective and general values, and to achieving or pro-
voking substantial changes in a number of private and public stan-
dards of practice and regulation.
The plurality and variety of the contexts in which class actions
perform this function have an obvious feedback effect upon the de-
vice itself.  The general class action splits into several sub-types, each
of them oriented toward the achievement of specific purposes, and
each having—as a further consequence—different procedural fea-
tures and practical results.17
13. See DE NOVA, supra note 10.
14. See GIUSSANI, supra note 1, at 253-260; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, at 447; Devel-
opments in the Law: Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1332, 1576 (1976); Angelo Dondi,
Funzione “remedial” delle “Injunctive class actions,” 42 RIV. TRIM. DIR. PROC. CIV. 245 (1988).
15. Abraham Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1284 (1976).
16. See FISS, supra note 8.
17. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, supra note 1, at 3.
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In civil law systems the situation is completely different.  First of
all, it should be noted that attention to the judicial protection of so-
called collective, diffuse, or fragmented interests and concerns about
the access to courts of people vested with such interests only began to
slowly emerge in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s.18  Some im-
portant improvements in this area occurred in a few countries during
this period,19 while in many countries things began to change much
later.  Some significant, but isolated, reforms date back to as recently
as the late nineties,20 and not surprisingly, these problems remain un-
resolved in various legal systems.
Moreover, the starting point of this complex, uncertain, and la-
borious movement is not the perceived need to provide compensation
for harms or injuries individually suffered by the members of groups
or classes of people similarly situated.  Instead, the goal pursued by
most of the (few) European legislators when enacting statutes in this
area is to provide for new regulations, or to change the existing ones,
with regard to specific and relatively narrow areas of the legal system.
The most significant examples are the German Verbandsklage (an ac-
tion aimed at obtaining the judicial nullification of illegal clauses in
mass contracts), and similar devices introduced in other countries
18. See, e.g, LE AZIONI A TUTELA DI INTERESSI COLLETTIVI (Vittorio Denti ed., 1976);
Mauro Cappelletti, Vindicating the Public Interest Through the Courts: A Comparativist’s Con-
tribution, in III ACCESS TO JUSTICE: EMERGING ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES, 513-564 (Mauro
Cappelletti & Bryant Garth eds., 1979); LA TUTELA DEGLI INTERESSI DIFFUSI NEL DIRITTO
COMPARATO (Antonio Gambaro ed., 1976); VINCENZO VIGORITI, INTERESSI COLLETTIVI E
PROCESSO: LA LEGITTIMAZIONE AD AGIRE (1979); Mauro Cappelletti, Formazioni sociali e
interessi di gruppo davanti alla giustizia civile, 30 RIV. DIR. PROC. 361 (1975); J.A. Jolowicz,
Protection of Diffuse, Fragmented and Collective Interests in Civil Litigation: English Law, 42
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 222 (1983); Michele Taruffo, I limiti soggettivi del giudicato e le “class action”,
24 RIV. DIR. PROC. 618 (1969).
19. See, e.g., in Germany, the so-called Verbandsklage and collective action in the domain
of unfair competition.  About the German equivalents of class actions, see GIUSSANI, supra
note 1, at 329; HARALD KOCH, PROZESSFÜHRUNG IM ÖFFENTLICHEN INTERESSE (1983);
Nicolò Trocker, La Tutela Giurisdizionale Degli Interessi Diffusi Con Particolare Riguardo Alla
Protezione Dei Consumatori Contro Atti Di Concorrenza Sleale: Analisi Comparativa
Dell’esperienza Tedesca, in LA TUTELA DEGLI INTERESSI DIFFUSI NEL DIRITTO COMPARATO
447-488 (Antonio Gambaro ed., 1976); Giorgio De Nova, La legge tedesca sulle condizioni gen-
erali di contratto, RIV. CRIT. DIR. PRIV. 134 (1978); Peter Gottwald, Class Actions auf Leistung
von Schadensersatz nach amerikanischem Vorbild im deutschen Zivilprozess?, 91 ZZP 1 (1978)
(on file with Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law); Harald Koch, Class and Public
Interest Actions in German Law, 5 CIVIL J. Q. 66 (1986); Walter, supra note 2.
20. See, e.g., supra note 10, the Italian Act of 1996, introducing a kind of Verbandsklage
against unlawful contractual clauses, with the new art. 1469 sexies of the Civil Code (stating that
“the associations representing consumers and producers. . .may sue the producer or the associa-
tion of producers that make use of general contractual clauses, and ask the court for an injunc-
tion prohibiting the use of unfair conditions. . .”).
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(e.g., Italy) to protect consumers against the use—imposed by large
companies—of illegal, unconscionable, or unfair clauses in contracts.21
This very specialized type of action is not aimed at compensating the
“weak party” (presumably the consumer) for a contract including un-
fair terms, but at eliminating the illegal clauses from standard form
contracts and therefore from general commercial practice.  This is a
regulatory goal that is pursued by means of a policy oriented judicial
remedy, not a compensatory goal pursued by means of an action for
individual damages.  This model is also followed to a substantial ex-
tent in other areas, such as the protection of fair competition, and is
frequently adopted by European Union directives in the area of con-
sumer protection and by national statutes in the same domain.
In the last couple of decades, the movement toward the protec-
tion of collective and diffuse interests—and therefore in favor of
group or class litigation—has accelerated and, in some systems, has
produced relevant outcomes.  Probably the most advanced achieve-
ment is the Brazilian Consumer Code that introduced a U.S.-type
form of class action in 1990, with interesting and original procedural
adaptations.22  Other countries have adopted some forms of group
litigation (e.g., the Netherlands and Portugal), and still other coun-
tries are on the way to introducing similar reforms (e.g., Sweden and
Norway).23
Within these complex and differentiated trends, various models
and strategies are taken into consideration by the proponents of re-
forms and by national legislators.  In some cases, for instance in Bra-
zil, the dominant model is the U.S. class action, but it has been
adapted to a civil law context (without jury trial and punitive dam-
ages).  Such experiences are very interesting because they show con-
cretely that the U.S. class action can be used in flexible ways as a
model for transplants into different legal cultures, without any need
to transfer all of its typical (but unnecessary) U.S. features.
However, the prevailing European trend seems to be toward not
following the class action model.  Continental legislators seem to pre-
fer the narrow and carefully restricted use of special procedural de-
vices aimed only at controlling or regulating practices in specific legal
areas.  There are, however, some European legal commentators who
21. See generally supra notes 19–20.
22. Consider, however, that beginning in 1985 other Brazilian statutes introduced several
forms of collective actions.
23. See, e.g., Nordh, supra note 2.
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favor a broader and more modern approach and who have suggested
the introduction of U.S.–type class actions.24
Even when the problem of damages cannot be set aside com-
pletely because compensation must be granted (as happens with
harms caused by water or air pollution), the compensatory purpose is
usually defined in such a way as to exclude the redress of individual
harms or losses.  For instance, in a 1986 Italian statute concerning en-
vironmental protection, the “environmental damages” (i.e., the
amount of money corresponding to the damage caused to the envi-
ronment) are considered “public damages.”25  As a consequence, the
State is the only subject entitled to recover financial compensation for
such damages.  The single subjects that have been harmed by pollu-
tion may recover their own personal damages only by means of indi-
vidual litigation.26
In fact, in many civil law systems, there is still widespread and
strong resistance toward the acceptance of any full-fledged form of
group or class litigation.  Statements such as “we don’t need any class
action” and “these are strange American things—better not to import
them” are rather frequent in European legal discourse.
IV.  RESISTANCE AGAINST GROUP LITIGATION
Such resistance results in exceedingly cautious and restrictive ap-
proaches for group litigation.  One of the consequences of such an
approach is that in many cases the access to justice for large groups or
classes of people is denied, although modern European constitutional
systems claim to guarantee every person his or her own right of ac-
tion.27  It seems that a wide gap exists in many legal systems between
the formal guarantee of access to justice for all and the effective pos-
sibility of every person being able to seek judicial protection of his or
her rights.  This gap is particularly broad when the rights in need of
protection belong to large groups of people.28  This is a relevant
24. See, e.g., GUISSANI, supra note 1; Lindblom, supra notes 2, 5.
25. See Istituzione del Ministero dell’Ambiente e norrme in materia di danno ambientale
(Institution of the Ministry of the Environment and provisions concerning environmental dam-
ages), Legge 8 July 1986, No. 349 (Italy).
26. See the essays collected in Il danno all’ambiente, special issue of RIV. CRIT. DIR. PRIV.
429-707 (1987).
27. See, e.g., COSTITUZIONE DELLA REPUBBLICA ITALIANA tit. I, art. 24 (Italy);
CONSTITUCION ESPAÑOLA tit. II, art. 24 (Spain).
28. For a broad overview of the access to justice problems in several countries, see ACCESS
TO JUSTICE I-IV (M. Cappelletti et al. eds., 1978-79).
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problem of constitutional implementation that, unfortunately, is be-
yond the scope of this discussion.
Instead, it is worth identifying (although not to justify) some of
the sources of the resistance to developed forms of group litigation.
Without any claims of completeness, at least three main tentative ex-
planations may be advanced.
A. Ignorance and Negative Propaganda
The reality of the devices existing in some developed legal sys-
tems for the protection of group or class interests is simply not known
in a number of procedural cultures.  Incredible as it may seem at the
dawn of the twenty-first century, comparative legal studies in the area
of civil justice are still in the hands of a minority of legal scholars
around the world.  This is especially true with regard to the problems
discussed here.  Many lawyers and scholars—even in so-called “ad-
vanced” countries—are still quite content with their cultural parochi-
alism and their substantial ignorance of what is going on beyond their
national borders.  With specific reference to U.S. class actions, it may
be said, quoting the title of a well-known essay written by Arthur
Miller in 1979, that the “Frankenstein monster” was—and still is—
made much more visible than the “knight with the shining armour.”29
Correspondingly, the European rejection of class actions—essentially
based upon ignorance—has usually been justified by the necessity of
preventing such a monster from penetrating the quiet European legal
gardens.
B. Distorted Perspectives
A significant aspect of this general attitude of rejection is that the
problem of class actions (erroneously perceived to be the only possi-
ble kind of group litigation) has been mixed up with other things that
may appear particularly strange and disturbing to a European lawyer.
One of these things is the practice of awarding huge punitive dam-
ages, especially in jury-tried mass tort cases.  Civil law systems do not
allow punitive damages and have no juries in civil proceedings.  Since
the practice of class actions is commonly associated (in the naïve
European conception of the U.S. system of litigation) with immense
punitive damages, the rejection of the latter entails the rejection of
the former.  Of course, punitive damages may also be awarded in in-
29. Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the
“Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979).
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dividual actions, and class actions do not necessarily result in high pu-
nitive damage awards.  However, this distinction seems too subtle for
most European lawyers to perceive.
The second thing that seems unacceptable to Europeans is the
U.S. system of contingent fees and particularly the practice of propor-
tioned fees, in which the plaintiff’s lawyer gets a percentage of the
amount recovered.  Contingent and proportioned fees are illegal, for
various traditional reasons, in many civil law systems.  Thus, the class
action model is rejected because proportioned fees are common in
this type of action.30  Of course one may observe that proportioned
fees (when they are admitted) also exist in individual litigation and
that a class action may be filed even without considering propor-
tioned fees; however—once again—many civil lawyers seem unable
to grasp such an obvious distinction.
C. Continuing Force of Traditional Concepts
An important source of the resistance to change, specifically to
the class action model, is the force of inertia exerted by a group of
traditional concepts customarily used to define the size of the arche-
typal litigation from a subjective and objective point of view.  A full
discussion of all these concepts is not necessary here, but a couple of
examples may suffice to illustrate the point.
One example is the standard that is commonly used to determine
who has standing to sue in civil litigation.  The traditional perception
is that only individuals are vested with a right of action for the protec-
tion of their own individual substantive rights.31  The typical plaintiff
is an individual who files a claim concerning an allegedly violated sin-
gle and specific right of his or her own and seeks an individual rem-
edy against an individual defendant.  Sometimes, it may happen that
one of the parties is a public subject, such as the State, the govern-
ment, or an administrative agency, but from a procedural point of
view, it makes no difference.  It may even happen that a public party
files a claim with the purpose of protecting super-individual interests,
but it normally occurs when public or general interests are at stake
and when the public subject is vested with the right or obligation to
represent these interests.  Take, for instance, the case of a public
prosecutor who acts as a plaintiff in a civil case representing a public
interest that is connected with or affected by a private legal situation.
30. See, e.g., GIUSSANI, supra note 1, at 398.
31. See id. at 376.
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There is, then, a correspondence between private rights and private
subjects on the one hand, and between public interests and public
subjects on the other.32  However, no matter whether private or pub-
lic, the fundamental model of litigation is still that of individuals pur-
suing the protection of individual rights against other individuals.
In this context, an association representing collective or diffuse
interests is something strange and unusual—it does not fit well with
traditional ideas of how civil litigation is pursued, and therefore is not
easily acknowledged as a procedural party.  Associations are usually
allowed to litigate with the aim of protecting their own institutional
rights or interests (in other words, as single subjects), but—as a rule
and with a few specific exceptions—they are not allowed to litigate on
behalf of their members, let alone act as representatives of larger or
even undetermined groups or classes of people (e.g., consumers,
workers, or people living in polluted areas).33  To open the way to
such a broad function of associations, specific statutory rules are usu-
ally required, but these rules are normally intended as exceptions to
the traditional stable principles governing the issue of individual
standing to sue.  In fact, such rules are relatively infrequent, and in
most cases, they cover only a narrow range of specific situations.
The second example, theoretically connected to the first, is illus-
trated by the principles governing the res judicata effects of a civil
judgment.  These principles are based on a strict conception of claim
preclusion, according to which the precluding effect deals exclusively
with the main substantive issue that has been decided.  Moreover,
there is no res judicata effect in favor of or against any subject that
was not a party to the proceeding (except the parties’ privies).  In
other words, there is no issue preclusion (or collateral estoppel) with
regards to nonparties.  The extension of res judicata effects beyond
the parties—which is typical of representative actions and is the core
of their function—is, in principle, excluded.  It seems that insofar as
these traditional standards are retained as valid and binding, there is
32. For some comparative overviews, see Mauro Cappelletti, Governmental and Private
Advocates for the Public Interest in Civil Litigation: A Comparative Study, in II ACCESS TO
JUSTICE: PROMISING INSTITUTIONS 769 (M. Cappelletti & J. Weisner eds., 1979); Bryant Garth,
Group Actions in Civil Procedure: Class Actions, Public Actions, Parens Patriae and Organiza-
tion Actiona, in Rapports Généraux XIII Congrès International 205, 231 (1992) (on file with
Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law).
33. See, e.g., LOUIS BORÉ, LA DÉFENSE DES INTÉRÊTS COLLECTIFS PAR LES
ASSOCIATIONS DEVANT LE JURIDICTIONS ADMINISTRATIVES ET JUDICIAIRES (1997); GROUP
ACTIONS AND CONSUMER PROTECTION—L’ACTION COLLECTIVE ET LA DEFENSE DES
CONSOMMATEURS (Thierry Bourgoignie ed., 1992).
TARUFFO.DOC 08/06/01  12:53 PM
2001] GROUP LITIGATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 417
no room for procedural mechanisms based on the assumption that a
judgment may affect a group or a class of individuals that were not ac-
tually parties to the proceeding.  Even other solutions, such as the ef-
fect of res judicata secundum eventum litis (i.e., only in favor of non-
parties) that is allowed in the Brazilian version of class actions, are
hardly compatible with those principles (and, in fact, the issue preclu-
sion secundum eventum is admitted by ad hoc statutory rules only in
exceptional and very limited cases).34
All these concepts are the product of a historical tradition deeply
embedded in European procedural culture.  Therefore, at least to
some extent, one may understand that setting them aside requires a
very difficult and complex cultural change.  A slow evolution over a
long period of time is probably necessary to adapt these concepts to
the new and different situations emerging in the administration of
civil justice.  However, the pressure to achieve effective protection of
super-individual rights and interests is rapidly increasing.  Under such
pressure, at least some of the traditional deadweights still existing in
many procedural cultures may be set aside, and perhaps ways for sig-
nificant improvements can be found.
V.  TWO TYPES OF INDIVIDUALISM
In an effort to interpret the differences just outlined, it is possible
to think of two different kinds of individualism.  On the one hand, we
find a sort of altruistic individualism by looking at social and legal
contexts in which single individuals are active (and litigate) not only
for their own personal advantage, but also to protect or enforce the
rights or interests of others similarly situated because they are in-
volved in the same legal situation.  Here, the individual feels respon-
sible for what happens to other individuals and is inclined to engage
in activities aimed at protecting collective or public interests.  In the
context of such an ethical orientation, one may speak of the single
citizen as a private attorney general—an altruistic private subject who
also acts on behalf of groups or classes of other subjects.35
This brand of altruistic individualism is sometimes active in
broader spheres concerning collective or general interests.  Within
these spheres, it may trigger a dynamic and dialectical relationship
34. See, e.g., ANTONIO GIDI, COISA JULGADA E LITISPENDENCIA EM AÇOES COLECTIVAS
57-185 (1995); Taruffo, supra note 18; Michele Taruffo, “Collateral estoppel” e giudicato sulle
questioni (I), 26 RIV. DIR. PROC. 651 (1971); Michele Taruffo, “Collateral estoppel” e giudicato
sulle questioni (II), 27 RIV. DIR. PROC. 272 (1972).
35. See, e.g., Cappelletti, supra note 32, at 773.
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between litigation, legislation, and government for the protection of
these interests. Where legislation and government are inefficient, in-
capable of acting, or insensitive to general policy problems, litigation
managed by altruistic individuals can be (given the necessary legal
conditions) a useful substitute and may spur the political power and
the administration to change the existing situation.  It is by means of
litigation that altruistic individuals may achieve compensation for
harms inflicted to classes of people or fight for new private or public
regulations concerning large numbers of subjects.  Roughly speaking,
group litigation is complementary to legislation and government in a
double sense—when the public powers are ineffective, litigation per-
forms its function as a means both to protect and directly enforce
rights and interests in a collective fashion and as a force of pressure
on legislation and government for substantive protection of these
rights and interests.
The second type of individualism is typically egoistic, since it
emerges when individuals are active in starting and prosecuting cases,
but with the exclusive aim of pursuing their personal self-interest.
Super-individual and collective interests are beyond the scope of liti-
gation managed by egoistic individuals who are not inclined to pursue
or achieve anything but their own personal advantage.  They are not
willing to spend time and money in order to protect the rights of
other people.  In these cases, litigation is strictly selfish—it serves
nothing except the purposes of single private subjects involved in in-
dividual cases.
This egoistic approach leaves out of the range of litigation every
concern that may be related to the protection of collective interests,
the enforcement of diffuse rights or the development and implemen-
tation of policies aimed at ameliorating the conditions of groups or
classes.  These issues exist and raise relevant problems in all devel-
oped societies, but the egoistic individualist displaces them far beyond
the borders of civil litigation (and of his or her own concern).
Correspondingly, things such as collective interests, diffuse
rights, and general or public policies are ascribed to non-private and
non-individual entities, and primarily to the State (viewed as an ab-
stract concept) or to the government (viewed as an administrative or-
ganization for the management of non-individual and then non-
private interests).  This traditional orientation to ascribe the task of
dealing with super-individual problems to “someone else”—at any
rate not to single private individuals—has undergone interesting de-
velopments in the last few decades.  One of these developments is the
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emergence and the growing importance of supranational organiza-
tions that are also active in the area of collective and diffuse rights.
For instance, the European Union is engaged in consumer protection.
It is on the basis of a directive from the EU that several countries (in-
cluding Italy and Germany) recently enacted statutes providing some
forms of group action.36
The other development is the birth and growth of a number of
associations pursuing super-individual goals such as environmental
and consumer protection.37  They are usually private institutions cre-
ated on a voluntary basis with the aim of pursuing collective or gen-
eral purposes on behalf of large groups of people.  There is, however,
an important reason to exclude any similarity between these associa-
tions and private individuals, at least in the European context and
from the point of view of group litigation.  In most cases, associations
are allowed to sue for the protection of collective interests only when
they have particular characteristics defined by the law (concerning
charters, number of members, organization, and so forth).  Moreover,
the existence of these conditions is normally checked by an official
entity (usually a ministry), and then the approved association is in-
cluded on an official list.38  Thus, there is strict bureaucratic control
exercised by the government, and only a few officially authorized as-
sociations may actually have a role in litigation concerning group or
class interests.  In a sense, then, associations are private, but perform
a sort of quasi-public function under public control, almost as if they
were branches of the government.
All these phenomena, especially the emergence of public or
quasi-public subjects in the domain of collective or general interests,
deserve careful consideration.  In this context we are left with some
important but unsolved problems.  What happens if—as frequently
occurs—the State or the government is inefficient, or does not have
enough money to spend for the protection of those interests?  On the
other hand, why should the State (in other words, taxpayers) be
charged with the compensation of damages caused by private wrong-
doers, and then only in cases where many people are harmed and the
amount of compensatory damages is particularly high?  What hap-
36. See, e.g., supra note 20.  See also Koch, supra note 2.
37. There are dozens of such associations in various European countries, including work-
ers’ unions, consumer and environmental associations, and other associations protecting a wide
range of super-individual interests.
38. See, e.g., the Italian Act of 1986 supra note 25, providing for a list of environmental as-
sociations that has to be kept by the Ministry of Industry.
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pens when associations are too small or too weak, or when they are
just self-serving (i.e., acting just in order to collect money or to get
new members), or make the wrong choices and do not adequately
protect all the collective interests they claim to represent?
In an optimal and ideal system, such gaps could be filled by pri-
vate group or class litigation, but—as we have seen above—this can
only happen when the dominant attitude is altruistic individualism,
and when altruistic individuals are able to avail themselves of ade-
quate legal procedures.  This does not happen in societies where the
dominant value is egoism, where individuals are moved only by self-
ish interests and are inclined to leave to some “big brother” the pro-
tection of super-individual interests and the implementation of gen-
eral policies.  At any rate, it could not happen in legal systems that do
not provide the necessary procedural mechanisms for group litigation.
In fact, even assuming that in a given society some altruistic individu-
als exist, they could not be active on behalf of other people if the legal
system does not supply them with suitable and viable legal devices.
VI.  BROADER CONTEXTS
All the differences and disputed issues sketched out above make
it clear that in the area of group litigation we are faced not only with
interesting developments that are still in progress, but also with a
complex and multi-faceted clash of different cultures, ethical and so-
cial attitudes, legal and political values, and even different psycho-
logical approaches to the themes of collective rights and their protec-
tion.  Correspondingly, in order to understand the problematic nature
of modern group litigation, we must take into consideration a very
broad spectrum, including a variety of different legal institutions and
cultures.
At this point one may wonder whether the only worthwhile thing
to do is to take note of all these variations and just pause to contem-
plate the complexity of reality, or whether we should look for alterna-
tive and more fruitful ways of addressing the problems discussed thus
far.  The correct approach seems to be the latter, especially because
there are still more, relatively new factors deserving thorough consid-
eration.  These factors may be identified by looking at some of the
many legal consequences stemming from the immensely complex
phenomenon of economic, financial, and commercial globalization.
These consequences cannot be discussed here at length, but a general
remark may suffice.  In a globalizing world, a growing number of legal
relationships and situations cannot be interpreted any longer solely
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within the frameworks of nation-states or national legal systems.
Many legal issues and transactions that used to be typically nation-
wide in the past, or even much smaller in scale, now frequently turn
into transnational and sometimes worldwide legal problems.  Just to
take a few examples: environmental pollution is no longer a national
problem (as Chernobyl and other cases unfortunately show); using
harmful products or dangerous pharmaceuticals is no longer a local
problem; and race or gender discrimination in labor relations is no
longer a problem of some specific areas, since the transnational or-
ganization of industrial production allows big companies to exploit
and underpay workers in underdeveloped countries.
Correspondingly, the classes of people exposed to harms and in-
juries that should be prevented and compensated are also tending to
expand far beyond the customary size of relatively small groups ex-
isting within the national borders of single countries.  Smokers ad-
dicted to U.S. cigarettes do not live only in the United States; people
eating meat infected with mad cow disease do not live only in Eng-
land.  These consumers may number thousands or billions all around
the world.  The same may be said of many other situations—one
thinks of consumers of any kind of product sold on a mass scale in a
transnational market, or users of financial services in the worldwide
economy, for transactions made in online markets, and so on.
This way of considering some of the trends that are quickly de-
veloping in the globalizing world opens immense spaces—the extent
of which are still difficult to imagine—and this may be a frightening
sensation if one perceives correctly the dimension of the problems
that still have to be solved in order to afford effective protection of
individual rights in the globalized world.  It is clear, at any rate, that
our traditional culture does not supply us with any ready-made solu-
tions for these problems.  Yet it is also clear that they cannot simply
be ignored or denied, since their transnational dimension is in re ipsa.
What we can reasonably do is acknowledge that these are the main
challenges facing us in the future, and that to some extent they are al-
ready present in modern societies all around the world.  Our primary
task is to find ways to cope with these challenges in order to preserve
and improve the concrete realization of the value of real access to jus-
tice for all and the effective judicial protection of every person’s
rights.
